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This paper analyzes patterns of foreign direct investment in India.  We investigate how 
labor conflict, credit constraints, and indicators of a state’s economic health influence 
location decisions of foreign firms.  We account for the possible endogeneity of labor 
conflict variables in modeling the location decisions of foreign firms.  This is 
accomplished by using a state-specific fixed effects framework that captures the presence 
of unobservables, which may influence investment decisions and labor unrest 
simultaneously.  Results indicate that labor unrest is endogenous across the states of 
India, and has a strong negative impact on foreign investment.   
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Section 1:  Introduction 
With the initiation of liberalization policies and economic reforms in India in 
1991
1, the role of private investment in economic growth has gained significant 
importance.  States now compete with one another by instituting policies to attract new 
investment, especially from foreign sources.  It is evident that states benefit from the 
presence of foreign investment, both in terms of increased productivity and other 
spillover effects.  This is clear from table 2 (these basic regressions are used to motivate 
our study, we implement a more rigorous approach below), where the number and shares 
of foreign firms appear to have clear positive effects on net value-added and the net 
income of states.
2  In the light of this evidence, inter-state competition across the regions 
of India has heightened.  This paper studies some of the factors that influence foreign 
direct investment (FDI) across the states of India.  These factors include labor conflicts, 
credit and market conditions, and other state-level economic indicators.  We find that 
overseas investment is particularly sensitive to variables that measure labor conflict at the 
state level.  
Although labor unrest, credit availability, and other measures of the “economic 
health” of states exert a substantial influence on the location decisions of new foreign 
investment, it is unlikely that the effect of these variables is exogenous.  In particular, 
labor laws in India fall under the purview of state governments.  This introduces variation 
in labor statutes across the different states, and also allows for the possibility that state 
governments may manipulate labor laws in order to attract more investment from abroad.  
Hence for example, state governments may influence the location decisions of foreign 
companies by providing incentives in the form of subsidies and tax-breaks, or by 
 
1 India started major economic reforms and nationwide liberalization in 1991 in response to a fiscal and balance of 
payments crisis.  These reforms encompassed all major areas – like industrial policy, trade and exchange rate policy, 
tax reforms and public sector policies.  
2 The positive effect of FDI shares is measured imprecisely in column (2) of table 2.   3
introducing amendments that make labor legislation within the state more pro-employer 
(and consequently, less pro-worker). 
  In this paper, we consider the effect of labor conflicts on the location choice of 
foreign firms, and implement an approach that allows us to control for the possible non-
random nature of labor unrest.  Our method is unique in that it not only allows us to 
confirm the presence of endogeneity; it also allows us to sign the direction of the bias that 
results when the heterogeneous nature of labor unrest is not taken into account.  We 
implement our method in two steps.  First, we use a state fixed-effects model to account 
for the effect of unobservables that may influence location decisions of new foreign firms 
and the labor conflict variable simultaneously.  Second, we extract estimated measures of 
state-level unobservables from the first step.  These are then used as determinants of 
labor unrest across the various states of India.  Results from the second step confirm the 
non-random nature of our labor conflict variable. 
We find striking evidence that new foreign investment in India is negatively 
influenced by state-level labor unrest, and positively affected by state-level credit and 
market features.  Real gross domestic product exerts a positive influence on shares of 
FDI, whereas planned outlay and state-support for research and development have the 
hypothesized effects (although these are imprecisely measured).  Furthermore, results of 
our two-step estimation confirm that the influence of labor unrest is not exogenous.  In 
fact, states with high latent FDI location propensities (this term is discussed in detail 
below) experience lower levels of labor unrest. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses previous literature in the 
area.  This includes a review of studies that have analyzed the determinants of FDI 
location in both developed and developing countries.  Section 3 provides details on the 
technique used in the paper, and section 4 discusses our data.  The results of our   4
                                                
estimations are also presented in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes with policy implications.  
All tables and figures are provided at the end of the paper.     
 
Section 2:  Literature Review 
  Governments do much to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) since domestic 
firms operating in local markets benefit from the productivity and knowledge spillovers 
generated by foreign owned firms and their subsidiaries.  Recent research has 
documented that productivity differences across countries are tied to variations in foreign 
and domestic innovation (Keller, 2002, Eaton and Kortum, 1999), and that flows of 
foreign direct investment significantly predict international technology transfers.  The 
extent to which FDI is valued may be gauged by considering the incentives offered by 
governments to attract the flow of foreign funds.  For example, the U.S. state of Alabama 
spent $230 million to influence the location of a Mercedes plant in 1994.
3
  Incentives to attract FDI are not provided by the governments of developed 
countries alone.  Developing countries, particularly in East Asia, have managed to spur 
economic growth by harnessing the power of foreign direct investment.  Researchers 
argue that the adoption of FDI-friendly policies was responsible for China’s ability to 
maintain a growth rate that exceeded 10 percent per annum in the 1990s
4, and that by 
tapping into foreign capital, technology, and markets, Malaysia was able to transform 
itself from an exporter of raw-materials to an exporter of manufactured commodities.  
Other Asian countries that have recognized the importance of FDI include Indonesia and 
Thailand. 
 
3 Head, K. (1998), “Comment on Doms and Jensen”, in Robert Baldwin, Robert Lipsey, and J. David Richardson 
(eds.), Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p. 
256. 
4 Bajpai, N., and J. Sachs (2000), “Foreign Direct Investment in India: Issues and Problems”, Harvard Institute for 
International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 759. p. 4. 
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  Since tangible evidence exists to suggest that increased flow of funds from 
overseas influences economic growth in the receiving economy, FDI has been linked to 
poverty reduction also.  Economic growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
economic development and poverty alleviation.  Although distribution of wealth created 
by economic growth is important in the fight against poverty, clearly, growth lays the 
foundation for improved well-being by increasing the “size-of-the-pie”.  With its positive 
effect on growth, FDI is key to poverty reduction initiatives.  Moreover, foreign 
enterprises may have indirect effects on poverty by incrementing human capital.  When 
foreign firms hire local workers, the latter benefit from the training and other human 
resource improvements that may be offered by the foreign firm.  This has additional 
positive income effects over and above those already created by productivity and 
technology spillovers.  That FDI is an important ingredient in poverty reduction 
initiatives cannot be disputed. 
Despite these well-documented truths about FDI, India has lagged in terms of 
attracting its share of foreign capital.  In discussing manufacturing firms in developing 
countries, Tybout (2000) summarizes that “…because of institutional entry barriers, labor 
market regulations, poorly functioning financial markets and limited domestic demand, 
the industrial sectors of developing countries are often described as insulated, inefficient 
oligopolies”.
5  This was particularly true of India before 1991.  After 1991, India adopted 
a policy of economic openness that liberalized banking, substantially reduced entry 
barriers primarily through a reduction in tariffs and the increased ability of foreign firms 
to repatriate profits overseas, and removed bureaucratic red-tape associated with foreign 
equity ownership in domestic firms of up to 51% (before 1991, foreign firms were 
 
5 Tybout, J.R. (2000), “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?”, Journal 
of Economic Literature 38(1). p. 30.   6
                                                
allowed to own a maximum of 40% equity in Indian firms
6, after 1991, they were 
allowed controlling ownership).  Such measures significantly improved flows of foreign 
capital into the country, although levels are still far from optimal.  For example, the ratio 
of actual FDI as a proportion of FDI approved from 1991 to 1998 was only 21.7%
7 in 
India, as opposed to China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, where this ratio was 
substantially higher. 
Researchers have documented several obstacles to increased flows of FDI into 
India.  These include the fact that foreign ownership of more than 51% equity still 
requires government approval (which involves substantial lags of time), tariff rates 
continue to remain high by international standards, there is a lack of decentralized 
decision-making at the level of state governments, exit barriers still exist (for example, a 
firm that hires over one hundred workers needs to get approval from the state government 
before it can shut down operations), banking and insurance systems are not competitive, 
and finally, labor laws are overly stringent.  In this paper, we consider how labor conflicts 
and other indicators of a state’s “economic health” (these indicators include share of 
disbursements from the Investment Credit and Industrial Corporation of India (ICICI) 
Bank, amount of loans disbursed by the Export Import (EXIM) Bank, and state support 
for research and development) influence the location of overseas investment projects in 
India. 
We focus on the role of labor conflicts for two reasons.  First, labor laws fall 
under the jurisprudence of state governments in India.  Thus, as observed before, states 
may use labor laws as instruments to attract (or deter) foreign direct investment.  On a 
 
6 Chhibber, P.K., and S.K. Majumdar (1999), “Foreign Ownership and Profitability: Property Rights, Control, and 
the Performance of Firms in Indian Industry”, Journal of Law and Economics 42(1). p. 213.  
7 Bajpai, N., and J. Sachs (2000), “Foreign Direct Investment in India: Issues and Problems”, Harvard Institute for 
International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 759. p. 2. 
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more general level, heterogeneity in labor regulations at the state level in India arises 
from two sources.  First, depending on the (political) nature of the government in power, 
states pass amendments to labor laws that are either more pro-worker or more pro-
employer.  Second, the implementation of laws may be affected by other considerations.  
For example, in a state like West Bengal, the Communist party has been in power for the 
past twenty years.  It is common knowledge that the party has a pro-worker bias.  This 
may affect outcomes of collective bargaining, disputes, and strikes, even without any 
formal changes in labor policies at the state government level.  Given costs of locating in 
India (exit barriers, lack of adequate infrastructure, and other factors mentioned above), it 
is likely that foreign firms will veer away from states that have a pro-worker bias (pro-
worker bias may be signaled by a large number of labor conflicts/disputes) since such 
biases may translate into higher production costs, and thus, reduced profits.  In this 
context, it is important to note that labor laws are subject to manipulation by state 
governments, but variables such as ICICI and EXIM loans (which we use as proxies of a 
state’s overall “economic health”) are not.  It is our hypothesis that such manipulations 
result in the fact that labor laws influencing employer-employee relations cannot be 
treated exogenously.  Other variables that are not under the control of state governments 
(such as our proxies for a state’s overall economic climate) are considered to be 
exogenous in our estimations.  (Note that our use of a state fixed-effects approach 
corrects for omitted variable bias; we are thus confident that such biases do not 
contaminate variables in the estimation that are treated exogenously).  Hence, our study 
of endogeneity in the two-step framework mentioned above focuses on labor dispute 
variables alone.       
Our second reason for considering the influence of labor laws in addition to other 
indicators of state-level economic activity stems from a paper (Sanyal and Menon, 2005),   8
                                                
where it is shown that such factors significantly influence the location of new private and 
public plants in India from 1998-1999.  If Indian private and public plants are influenced 
by industrial regulations at the state level, then it is conceivable that foreign private plants 
are even more sensitive to these issues.  Given their lack of knowledge of ground realities 
and the additional rules that foreign enterprises may need to operate under, investment 
from overseas will be particularly cognizant of labor laws and other indicators of 
economic activity within a state.   
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to evaluate how foreign direct 
investment responds to measures of labor disputes and other state-level economic 
indicators in India.  In the context of developed economies, several researchers have 
studied the influence of industrial and labor relations on U.S. foreign direct investment.  
Cook (1997) examines outflows of funds from the U.S. to nineteen OECD countries.  He 
finds empirical evidence to conclude that foreign direct investment from the U.S. is 
negatively affected by “…the presence of high levels of union penetration, centralized 
collective bargaining structures, stiff government restrictions on layoffs, and pervasive 
contract extension policies”
8 in the receiving economies.  Karier (1995) considers 
whether the average rate of unionization across ten geographic regions predicts outward 
flows of investment from the United States.  His study does not find a significant 
relationship between levels of union activity and foreign direct investment. 
Contrary to Karier’s (1995) conclusion, our results suggest that foreign direct 
investment in India is very sensitive to measures of labor disputes.  Our specification 
provides consistent evidence to demonstrate that states with large numbers of work 
stoppages and lockouts deter the location of foreign plants.  Other variables such as loans 
 
8 Cooke, W.N. (1997), “The Influence of Industrial Relations Factors on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Abroad”, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 51(1). p. 3. from banking institutions, support for research and development (R&D) by state 
governments, and input cost variables, also have predictive power.  Furthermore, results 
from our fixed effects technique confirm that measures of labor conflicts are endogenous 
in an analysis of FDI location in India.  We find strong empirical evidence to substantiate 
our hypothesis that labor disputes across states of India arise in a non-random fashion – 
states may ‘subdue’ pro-worker legislations in order to attract foreign direct investment.   
 
Section 3:  Theoretical Background 
 
Section 3.1:  The Fixed Effects Model 
We justify our use of a fixed effects model by first presenting a linear Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression.  Thus, where  denotes the share of foreign projects in 
location (state) at time  ,   is a matrix of exogenous variables where idenotes a 
particular variable,  denotes a location, and denotes time,  is a matrix of labor 
dispute variables where i denotes a particular labor conflict variable for  ,   defined 
above, and  is an idiosyncratic error term, 
jt f
j t ijt X
j t jt i L ′
′ j t
jt υ
) 1 ( ' − − − + + = ′ jt ijt i jt i i jt X L f υ β γ  
  Equation (1) relates the share of FDI projects in state at time to labor conflict 




  Next, we implement a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to check that   is indeed 
exogenous in (1).  In order to accomplish this, is hypothesized to be a function of 
regional dummy variables (list of regional dummies is provided at the end of the paper) 
jt i L ′
jt i L ′
  9and the   in equation (1).  This is the standard format of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.  
The p-value from this test is 0.0139 (F[1,67]=6.39), thus we strongly reject the null 
hypothesis at the 95% level that OLS provides consistent results.  Results of the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test indicate that our labor dispute variable ( ) is endogenous, that is, it 
is correlated with a systematic component of the error term in equation (1).   
ijt X
jt i L ′
Given the fact that states benefit from the location of FDI projects, and thus may 
manipulate labor laws to reduce the incidence of labor conflicts, we hypothesize that  jt υ  
consists of a state specific component   and an idiosyncratic component  .  Equation 
(1) is modified to account for this state-specific heterogeneity.  This leads to the 
following:  
j µ jt ε
) 2 ( ' − − − + + + = ′ jt j ijt i jt i i jt X L f ε µ β γ  
  Equation (2) is a fixed effects regression that controls for state-specific 
unobservables which affect the labor variable .  The other (exogenous) variables 
in that are believed to influence the location of FDI projects across the various states 
of India include loans from ICICI Bank, loans from Exim Bank, real value of growth 
state domestic product, state support for R & D, volume of software exports, and other 
input cost variables such as wage levels and power rates.  
jt i L ′
ijt X
  Although the Durban-Wu-Hausman test provides evidence that our labor dispute 
variable cannot be treated exogenously, we are explicitly interested in the sign of the 
correlation between the labor variable and the state-specific error component in (2).  This 
is because the sign gives us information on the strategy that states use to attract FDI.  In 
particular if the sign is negative, then we have statistical evidence that states try to reduce 
the incidence of labor conflicts in order to influence the location of new FDI projects.  
  10Our methodology for analyzing the direction of such correlations is discussed in the next 
section.   
 
Section 3.2:  Estimating the Endogeneity of Labor Regulations 
Consider the following relationship between the labor variable and the measure of state-
level heterogeneity, .  j µ
) 3 ( − − − + + = ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ jt i j i jt i i jt i Z L η µ δ θ  
Equation (3) shows that the labor variable is a function of a set of exogenous 
determinants ( ) which include state specific measures such as the literacy rate, the 
proportion of urban male workers, measures of inequality, and regional dummy variables.  
As discussed before, since states benefit from having FDI projects, the presence of   in 
(3) captures the notion that some states may influence labor laws in order to attract more 
FDI projects.  These influences may be over and above those exerted by the variables in 
, and are unobserved by the researcher since they are not measured in the data.  
These unobserved influences are captured by the correlation of  with the systematic 
part of the error term in (3), .  Therefore, as long as 
jt i Z ′ ′
j µ
jt i Z ′ ′
jt i L ′
j µ 0 ≠ ′ i δ in (3),   is endogenous i
(2).  Thus an estimation of (2) that does not correct for this endogeneity will result in 
biased and inconsistent measures of 
jt i L ′ n 
i′ γˆ , the true estimated effect of the labor disputes 
variable on the share of FDI projects in a state. 
  With observations on variables across time, equation (2) may be estimated 
consistently by using a Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) approach.  An advantage 
of the LSDV approach is that it allows us to measure location specific effects, net of 
labor variables, loans from ICICI Bank, loans from EXIM Bank, inputs, and other 
  11variables in equation (2).  This is of use in assessing correlations between state specific 
unobservables and labor measures in equation (3).  Hence, we estimate equation (2) using 
the LSDV technique.  After this, we extract estimates of the (denoted as parameters 
from (2) for use as independent variables in equation (3).  These extracted  are 
interpreted as latent FDI location propensities for each state , net of labor and other 
variables. 
j µ ) ˆ j µ
j µ ˆ
j
  A potential problem with the j µ ˆ estimated from equation (2) is that they are likely 
to be measured with error (Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons,1993, Pitt, Rosenzweig, and 
Hassan,1990).  The nature of the measurement error problem
9 is as follows.  If FDI 
shares and labor regulation variables are measured inaccurately (as they may be), then the 
derived estimates of   are contaminated with the errors that affect the FDI and labor 
regulation variables in equation (2).  This implies that in measuring the effects of   on 
labor variables in equation (3), a simple linear model (such as OLS) leads to inconsistent 
results.  In fact, as is well known, measurement error in a right hand side variable in a 
least squares framework causes the true effect of that variable to be biased downwards 
(attenuation bias – the coefficient is biased towards zero).   
j µ ˆ
j µ ˆ
Consistent estimates may be obtained given errors in variables by using an 
instrumental variables technique.  As noted in Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (1990), 
variables that may be used as instruments include repeated observations (over time) on 
the variable that is measured with error ( ).  Repeated observations on the variable that 
is measured with error are valid instruments as long as errors are uncorrelated across time 
periods.  Given that there have been no dramatic changes across states in the time periods 
j µ ˆ
                                                 
  12
9 Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (1990) provide a detailed discussion of how the measurement error problem arises 
on pp. 1145-1146. we consider, we do not believe that the assumption of uncorrelated errors is an overly 
restrictive one.  Furthermore, we present tests for the validity of our instruments below.   
Since repeated observations on the measured with error variable may be used as 
instruments, we instrument for  from 1996-1997 using the  from 1998-2000.  
Equation (3) is then estimated using an instrumental variables technique.  A significant 
coefficient from the instrumental variables estimation of equation (3) provides 
evidence that the labor variable in equation (2) is endogenous. 
j µ ˆ j µ ˆ
i′ δˆ
  A brief discussion on the expected sign of  is warranted.  If  > 0, this would 
support a state government policy where regions with high  also see an increase in 






j µ ˆ experience low magnitudes of labor activity.  Since our labor variable measures 
labor disputes in the state, a negative sign on   suggests a decline in labor unrest in 
regions where FDI location propensities are high.  This may occur when state 
governments “subdue” labor laws in the hopes of translating high latent FDI location 
propensities into actual sizeable numbers of FDI projects within that state.  Indirect 
evidence for this may be obtained by considering the location of the seven export 
processing zones (EPZs) in India – five of these EPZs are located in states that have high 
latent FDI location propensities
i′ δˆ
10, and were at the forefront of enacting reforms to 
encourage foreign direct investment (Gujarat, Kerala, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and 
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10 FDI location propensities are high in these states since they possess a relatively skilled workforce and a well-
developed transportation and communication infrastructure.  Andhra Pradesh).
11  Given the fact that states value the presence of FDI, our prior is that 
the sign of   is negative.  i′ δˆ
 
Section 4:  Data and Results 
Section 4.1:  Variables and Data 
Table 1(B) provides the sources of the variables used in our estimations.
12  From 
1996 to 2000, the total number of FDI projects in India (as reported by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry) was 8,337.  Figure 1 depicts shares of FDI projects by state 
during 1996 – 2000 (our estimations span these years).  From the figure, it is clear that 
most foreign projects locate in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Delhi. 
 
Section 4.1.1:  Labor Conflict Variables  
Labor variables capture “on the ground” labor conditions. We consider several 
alternatives including the number of lockouts, number of strikes, and the number of man-
days lost in the state due to work-stoppages.  The summary statistics of these variables 
are provided in Table 1.  Figure 2 depicts one of the main labor conflict variables used in 
the estimations from 1996-2000 (the normalized number of man-days lost due to work-
stoppages).  In comparing figures 1 and 2, an inverse relationship between new FDI and 
the pro-worker stance of the state (as captured by the normalized number of man-days 
lost in disputes resulting in work stoppages) is apparent.  This is particularly true for 
states such as Kerala and West Bengal, which have traditionally favored workers over 
employers (these states have comparatively large numbers of man-days lost due to 
  14
                                                 
11 Bajpai, N., and J. Sachs (2000), “Foreign Direct Investment in India: Issues and Problems”, Harvard Institute for 
International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 759. p. 14. 
12We mention the original sources for the majority of our data, even though we use the electronic versions put 
together by Indiastat, a web based data vendor specializing in Indian data.    15
disputes in figure 2).  As seen from figure 1, the number of new foreign projects that 
Kerala and West Bengal receive is relatively small. 
 
Section 4.1.2:  Indicators of State “Economic Health”  
We use state-level economic characteristics like gross state domestic product, 
measures of credit availability such as EXIM bank loans and ICICI bank disbursements, 
planned outlay by the state on the manufacturing sector, and measures of research and 
development expenditures by the state government, as indicators of a state’s “economic 
health”. We hypothesize that FDI prefers to locate in states with relatively high levels of 
social and economic development.  Alternatively, high input costs and poor infrastructure 
should have negative impacts on location propensities.  In order to capture such 
influences, we use the average daily wage of unskilled male and female workers, the 
average power rate for large and small industries, and kilometers of surfaced roads 
available in the state.  Other variables that are thought to affect the location of foreign 
projects include the average Gini for rural and urban areas of the state, the average urban 
workforce participation rate for male and female workers, and measures of the 
availability of a skilled workforce such as enrolments in literacy programs.     
We hypothesize that labor conflict variables, variables that measure resource 
availability, input cost and infrastructure variables, and other indicators of economic 
development at the state level, have significant effects on the location of foreign projects.  
In particular, the availability of loans from EXIM and ICICI banks should have a sizeable 
positive impact on overseas investment since a large number of FDI projects have an 
export orientation. 
Before discussing our results, we note that our estimations are likely to be 
affected by two main sets of selection issues.  First, our data consists of only those FDI   16
projects that were located in the various states of India.  If labor conflict deters new 
investment, a large set of FDI projects may not have been undertaken.  Thus we have a 
non-randomly selected sample and our estimates may reflect sample selection bias.  
However, this is a conservative bias since our estimates do not capture the negative 
impact of labor conflict on those projects that were never implemented.   Our results thus 
underestimate the overall deterring effects of labor problems; eliminating the bias should 
only strengthen the results of our study. 
  Second, our estimates may be affected by bias resulting from selection on unobservables.  
Consider two scenarios.  First, a foreign firm that has extensive previous experience dealing with 
labor conflict issues decides the location of a project.  The firm may locate the project in a state 
with relatively more labor problems solely because it is confident of being able to handle future 
conflicts, given its past experience.  We can think of this firm (or project) as being more “able” 
to cope with labor problems.  Since we do not have data on firm’s past experience, this variable 
is unobserved from our perspective.  However, the lack of such data may not be too problematic.  
This is because such unobserved variables lead to an underestimation of the true negative impact 
of labor conflict.  If we included information on firm’s past experience in dealing with labor 
issues (that is, if we had this information), our results should become stronger. 
Alternatively, consider a scenario in which a state has a pro-worker reputation.  
That is, regardless of the true nature of labor laws, the local government has traditionally 
favored the worker in labor disputes.  Foreign firms may shy away from locating projects 
in such states even if labor problems are relatively infrequent.  Since we do not have 
information on the “local enforcement history” of states, the results of this study may 
overestimate the negative impact of labor conflict.  However, our use of state fixed-
effects controls for the influence of all such unobservables that are state-specific and time 
invariant.  We acknowledge that overestimation of labor conflict’s negative effect may   17
                                                
still be an issue in the case of unobservables that are not state-specific and time-invariant.  
Given paucity of data for correcting this in the present study, we hope to account for such 
concerns in future work.     
 
Section 4.2:  Empirical Results 
  Table 3(A) reports the results of a state fixed-effects estimation that controls for 
the endogeneity of our labor disputes variable.  The dependent variable is the share of 
FDI projects (in a particular year) received by a state.
13  From column (1) of table 3(A), 
we find that lagged man-days lost normalized by size of the workforce and the number of 
lockouts normalized by size of the workforce have significant negative impacts on the 
share of FDI projects that a state receives.  Loan disbursements from ICICI and EXIM 
banks, and the income level of a state (as measured by gross state domestic product) have 
strong positive effects on FDI.  Planned outlays and research expenditures by states have 
no significant effects on the dependent variable, although input cost variables such as the 
average wage of unskilled labor has a significant negative effect on the share of FDI 
projects that a state receives.  Column (2) reports results for the significant variables of 
the basic model in column (1). 
  In columns (3) – (4) of table 3(A), labor conflict variables are normalized by two 
different parameters.  In column (3), labor variables are normalized by the size of the 
state’s manufacturing sector; in column (4), labor variables are normalized by gross state 
domestic product.  In both cases our base results hold, that is, states with relatively high 
 
13 In an alternative specification, we used the share of total new FDI investment the state receives as the dependent 
variable.  In general, labor dispute variables (particularly man-days lost due to work-stoppage normalized by size of 
the workforce) exerted negative effects on the share of FDI investment at the state level.  We report results of 
estimations that use the share of FDI projects at the state level as the dependent variable, since these results are more 
robust.   18
                                                
levels of labor disputes receive smaller shares of FDI projects.
14  Results for the other 
variables in columns (3)-(4) are consistent with those obtained in the basic model of 
column (1).      Table 3(A) also provides measures of the estimated state-specific fixed 
effects.  We observe that for the parsimonious specification of the basic model in column 
(2), many of the state-specific fixed effects are significant.  This underlines the 
importance of controlling for state-specific unobservables in the estimation (a test that 
these state-level effects are jointly zero is strongly rejected).
15   
To investigate the influence of state-level heterogeneity on the labor disputes 
variable, we estimate models similar to the basic specification in table 3(A) separately for 
1996-1997 and for 1998 – 2000.  Estimates of state fixed-effects are obtained from both 
sets of regressions.  As discussed above, estimates of fixed effects from 1998-2000 are 
used as instruments for the fixed effects from 1996-1997.  The results of the instrumental 
variables specification are presented in table 3(B).  The dependent variable in both 
columns of table 3(B) is mean man-days lost due to work-stoppage (lagged 1 year) 
normalized by size of the workforce (mean of the variable taken over 1996 and 1997).  
The independent variables include instrumented values of the 1996-1997 state-specific 
fixed effects (identifying instruments are the state fixed-effects from 1998-2000, the 
average Gini variable for rural and urban areas, normalized expenditures by the state on 
research and development, and normalized number of research and development projects 
in the state), average wage, gross state domestic product, other labor conflict variables, 
measures for literacy, and dummies for regions of the country that have traditionally been 
pro-worker in their political orientation.  Since the normalized number of lockouts is 
 
14 In column (3), normalized number of strikes appears to increase the share of FDI projects that a state receives.  
This is counterintuitive, and is probably due to the high degree of correlation between the labor variables in column 
(3).  The normalized number of lockouts in column (4) also has a positive effect; this is similarly explained. 
15 F[16,58]=75.91, Probability > F = 0.0000.     19
                                                
insignificant in column (1), column (2) reports results for the estimation that excludes this 
variable. 
Both columns of table 3(B) show that the instrumented value of state-level 
unobservables has a significant negative impact on the labor conflict variable.  This 
negative sign suggests that in states where location propensities are high, governments 
modify labor regulations (make them more pro-employer) in the hopes of translating high 
latent FDI location propensities to actual increasing amounts of FDI.  Ignoring such 
correlations induces a downward bias in the labor coefficient, that is, the estimated effect 
will be smaller than its true value (note that the true effect of the labor conflict variable 
on shares of FDI is negative).   
Various tests of validity for our identifying instruments were conducted.  An F-test that these 
identifying instruments are jointly zero is rejected (F[4,11]=5.58, Probability > F = 0.0106).  We also 
conducted two tests of the overidentifying restrictions.  The p-value for Sargan N*R-sq test = 0.8231, 
and the p-value for the Basmann test = 0.9707.  These p-values indicate that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected, that is, our identifying instruments are valid. 
  Finally, we also investigate whether there are any biases that result from the differing size 
of state economies.  For example, if states with larger economies tend to have larger projects and 
smaller projects are excluded from our estimations, then spurious correlations could arise.  In 
order to determine whether such a bias is present, we formulate a ‘big state’ dummy
16.  This 
dummy takes the value one if a state’s industrial gross state product exceeds the median value 
(over all states).  We interact this dummy with the labor conflict variables, and introduce these 
interaction terms into the basic model of table 3(A).  The model thus contains the variables listed 
in column (1) of table 3(A) along with three additional terms (the interactions of the three labor 
disputes variables of column (1) with a big state dummy).  If systematic differences in labor 
 
16 Big state dummy = 1 if state industrial GSP is greater than the median.   20
unrest by size of the state economy exist, then the interaction terms should be significant.  Upon 
estimating the model, we find that the interactions are insignificant.  Hence our estimates do not 
suffer from bias which results due to the differing size of state economies.  
 
Section 5:  Conclusions 
  This paper investigates the sensitivity of overseas investment to labor conflict 
across states of in India, using a state fixed-effects approach.  We find that foreign direct 
investment tends to veer away from states that have high incidences of labor conflict, 
particularly as measured by the number of man-days lost due to work stoppages.  
Furthermore, results of our fixed effects technique confirm that measures of labor 
conflicts are endogenous in an analysis of FDI location in India.  We find striking 
empirical evidence that labor disputes across states of India arise in a systematic fashion 
– state-level heterogeneity measures have significant negative impacts on our labor 
conflict variable.  This suggests that states ‘muffle’ pro-worker legislations in the hopes 
of attracting new foreign direct investment.   
  This research has important implications for policy.  Since the presence of foreign 
direct investment has significant positive benefits for a state (as seen from estimates of 
table 2 and from a poverty amelioration perspective), local governments that seek to 
encourage investments from abroad should be given a free hand (within reasonable 
limits) to modify labor laws and regulations.  Moreover, states with low FDI location 
propensities (either due to poor infrastructure, lack of educated workers, or the presence 
of a political climate that favors an overly militant workforce) should be provided with 
adequate incentives by the central government to move to fostering an environment more 
hospitable to investment from overseas.  Such a strategy would be welfare improving 
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Summary Statistics  
 
Variable         Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variables                
Number of FDI projects norm. by GSDP  80  0.1990  0.2454  0.0000  1.0408 
Share of FDI projects  80  0.0625  0.0682  0.0016  0.2980 
Net value added in state norm. by GSDP  80  1840.4080  1720.7210  547.8171  9781.8170 
Net income of state  80  382249.8000  548769.1  0.0000  2668724 
Mean man-days lost due to work-stoppage  16  0.0027  0.0019  0.0004  0.0086 
(lag. 1 year) norm. by size of workforce              
(mean of variable taken over 1996 & 1997)              
Regressors                
Labor variables                
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage  80  0.0028  0.0042  0.0000  0.0333 
(lag. 1 year) norm. by size of workforce              
Number of lockouts normalized by  80  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0004 
size of workforce              
Number of strikes normalized by  80  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0002 
size of workforce              
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage (lag. 1   80  8.2980  11.9032  0.0000  77.0654 
year) norm. by size of state's manuf. sector              
Number of lockouts normalized by  80  0.2015  0.2544  0.0000  1.5560 
size of state's manufacturing sector              
Number of strikes normalized by  80  0.2854  0.1935  0.0129  0.8755 
size of state's manufacturing sector              
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage  80  2.0032  2.8690  0.0000  18.8793 
(lag. 1 year) norm. by GSDP              
Number of lockouts normalized by  80  0.1515  0.7382  0.0000  6.1345 
GSDP              
Number of strikes normalized by  80  0.0444  0.0641  0.0000  0.2993 
GSDP              
Variables that measure resource 
availability                
ICICI disbursement norm. by GSDP  80  17.2286  19.5034  1.1505  114.2497 
EXIM loans norm. by GSDP  80  0.0419  0.0468  0.0000  0.2276 
Planned outlay by state on manufac.  80  22.5605  19.1661  2.5724  84.3262 
Norm. by GSDP              
GSDP   80  616.1555  403.2261  31.6243  2007.8480 
Expenditures on R&D by state  80  11.0959  6.1438  0.0000  25.7124 
Norm. by GSDP              
Number of R&D projects   80  0.3110  0.6290  0.0000  3.3501 
Norm. by GSDP                
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Table 1 continued 
 
Summary Statistics  
 
Variable         Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Input cost and infrastructure variables                
Average wage for male and female  80  47.1998  13.3853  26.1633  96.2500 
unskilled labor              
Average power rate for large and  80  336.8785  67.0306  169.2153  480.7041 
small industries (lag. 1 year)              
Kilometers of surfaced roads   80  1.3763  3.7818  0.0000  16.2883 
(norm. by area of state) (lag. 1 year)              
Other variables                
Average Gini for rural and urban  80  0.2789  0.0165  0.2276  0.3150 
areas (lag. 1 year)              
Average urban workforce participation  80  32.6380  2.9860  24.4125  39.2750 
rate for males and females (lag. 1 year)              
Enrolment in literacy program  80  124.0121  103.9686  0.0000  761.5831 
 (per thousand of population)              
Dummy for southern states  80  0.2500  0.4357  0.0000  1.0000 
Dummy for eastern states  80  0.1875  0.3928  0.0000  1.0000 
Fixed effects                
State fixed-effects from 1996-1997  16  -0.1093  0.0771  -0.3611  -0.0272 
State fixed-effects from 1998-2000  16  0.0143  0.0534  -0.0354  0.1704 
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Table 1(B) 
 
Variables That Are Available From 1996-2000 With Their Sources 
 
Variables Source 
FDI       
FDI projects by state  SIA Newsletter 2001 Annual Issue, Ministry of  
   Commerce & Industry, Govt. of India 
Labor variables    
Number of lockouts, strikes  Rajya Sabha Starred Question No. 196, dated 08.03.2001 
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage  Pocket Book of Labour Statistics 2000,  
   Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour, Govt. of India 
Variables that measure resource 
availability 
  
EXIM bank loans  Report on Development Banking in India 2000-01, 
   Industrial Development Bank of India 
ICICI bank disbursement  Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No.1794, dated 8.8.2000 
Planned outlay by state on manufacturing  Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics,  
   Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Govt. of India, 2000 
Gross state domestic product  Central statistical organization 
Number of R&D projects  Research and Development Statistics -  
   Ministry of Science and Technology, Govt. of India 
Expenditures on R&D by state  Research and Development Statistics -  
   Ministry of Science and Technology, Govt. of India 
Net value added  Annual Survey of Industries (1996-2000) 
Net income of state  Annual Survey of Industries (1996-2000) 
Input cost and infrastructure variables    
Average daily wage for unskilled male and   Building Material Prices and Wages of Labour, Ministry of 
female workers  Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation, Govt. of India. 
Average power rate for large and small 
industries 
Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 845, dated 
24.07.2002. 
Kilometers of surfaced roads  Basic Road Transport Statistics of India,  
   Ministry of Transport and Highways, Govt. of India 
Other variables    
Average Gini for rural and urban areas  National Human Development Report 2001, 
    Planning Commission, Govt. of India. 
Average urban workforce participation rate  India Yearbook 2002, Manpower Profile. 
 for males and females    
Enrolment in literacy program  Annual Report 1998-99, Literacy Campaigns in India,   
   National Literacy Mission, Directorate of Adult Education, 
   Ministry of Human Resource Development. 
Normalization variables    
Industrial GSP  Central statistical organization 
Gross state domestic product  Central statistical organization 
Total workforce  2001 Census, Government of India 
Population in Thousands (1996-2000)  Population Projections for India and States 1996-2016,  
   Registrar General, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of 
India. 




Effect of FDI on Selected State Outcomes 
 
Variable  Net Value Added   Net Income 
   (normalized by gross state  of State 
   domestic product) in State    
   (1)  (2) 
Number of FDI projects  945.26255
#   
normalized by gross state domestic  (508.55880)    
Product       
        
Share of FDI projects     3345080 
      (4249360.00000) 
        
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage -3.16825 -3158.31205 
(lagged 1 year) normalized by  (51.58542)  (37917.00315) 
gross state domestic product       
        
Planned outlay by state on 
manufacturing normalized by  33.21648**  -3984.39995 
gross state domestic  (7.86574)  (5945.84403) 
Product       
        
Constant 909.25230**  269399.0343 
   (232.24996)  (345177.91568) 
Observations 80  80 
Number of state fixed-effects  16  16 
R-squared 0.274  0.024 
A linear state fixed-effects model is used to estimate the above specifications.  Data range from 1996-2000.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 3(A) 
Fixed Effects Estimation: Basic Model & Sensitivity Analyses 
              
Variable  Basic Model    Sensitivity Analyses    
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage  -0.97187**  -1.01394**       
(lag. 1 year) norm. by size of workforce  (0.31892)  (0.23688)       
Number of lockouts normalized by  -54.52534*  -41.82276
#      
size of workforce  (24.04185)  (24.92590)       
Number of strikes normalized by  0.63088         
size of workforce  (50.88053)         
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage (lag. 1        -0.00053**    
year) norm. by size of state's manuf. sector       (0.00017)    
Number of lockouts normalized by       -0.01734**    
size of state's manufacturing sector       (0.00563)    
Number of strikes normalized by       0.02775
#   
size of state's manufacturing sector       (0.01457)    
Man-days lost due to work-stoppage          -0.00166* 
(lag. 1 year) norm. by gross state dom. pdt.          (0.00075) 
Number of lockouts normalized by          0.00604* 
gross state domestic product          (0.00264) 
Number of strikes normalized by          -0.02276 
gross state domestic product          (0.02664) 
ICICI disbursement normalized by  0.00054**  0.00048**  0.00054**  0.00064** 
gross state domestic product  (0.00012)  (0.00012)  (0.00012)  (0.00012) 
EXIM loans normalized by  0.13941**  0.14613**  0.12982**  0.09522
#
gross state domestic product  (0.05159)  (0.05042)  (0.04689)  (0.05191) 
Planned outlay by state on manufacturing -0.00004    0.00002  -0.00021 
norm. by gross state domestic product  (0.00019)   (0.00017)  (0.00018) 
Gross state domestic product  0.00007*  0.00008*  0.00007
# 0.00007* 
   (0.00003)  (0.00003)  (0.00004)  (0.00003) 
Expenditures on R&D by state -0.00125    -0.00165  -0.00175 
norm. by gross state domestic product  (0.00117)   (0.00112)  (0.00106) 
Average wage for male and female  -0.00044
# -0.00052* -0.00039  -0.0003 
unskilled labor  (0.00027)  (0.00023)  (0.00026)  (0.00026) 
Average power rate for large and  0.00002    0.00003  0.00003 
small industries (lag. 1 year)  (0.00004)   (0.00003)  (0.00004) 
Average Gini for rural and urban  0.17783    0.13172  0.35981* 
areas (lag. 1 year)  (0.15940)   (0.14958)  (0.16976) 
Average urban workforce participation  -0.00028    -0.00034  -0.00074 
rate for males and females (lag. 1 year)  (0.00087)   (0.00093)  (0.00097) 
Kilometers of surfaced roads   -0.00037    -0.00012  -0.00138 
(norm. by area of state) (lag. 1 year)  (0.00209)   (0.00175)  (0.00213) 
Enrolment in literacy program  0.00001    -0.000003  0.00004
#
 (per thousand of population)  (0.00002)     (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
Data range = 1996-2000.  Dependent variable is share of FDI.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
# Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%;  
** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3(A) continued 
Fixed Effects Estimation: Basic Model & Sensitivity Analyses 
Variable  Basic Model     Sensitivity Analyses    
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Andhra Pradesh Dummy  -0.02517  0.0078  -0.00494  -0.06111 
   (0.05325)  (0.02244)  (0.05425)  (0.05078) 
Bihar dummy  -0.04422  -0.01055  -0.03286  -0.08297
#
   (0.04346)  (0.01282)  (0.04428)  (0.04311) 
Gujarat dummy  -0.02361  -0.00319  -0.01252  -0.04885 
   (0.05774)  (0.02087)  (0.05889)  (0.05235) 
Haryana dummy  0.01809  0.04171**  0.02449  -0.01174 
   (0.04910)  (0.01084)  (0.05049)  (0.04758) 
Karnataka dummy  0.04411  0.08045**  0.05472  0.00724 
   (0.05069)  (0.01714)  (0.05144)  (0.04909) 
Kerala dummy  0.0004  0.02694
# 0.01335 -0.03109 
   (0.04585)  (0.01389)  (0.04758)  (0.04629) 
Madhya Pradesh dummy  -0.05951  -0.02086  -0.04777  -0.09774
#
   (0.05114)  (0.01778)  (0.05177)  (0.04897) 
Maharashtra dummy  0.08931 0.11810*  0.10912  0.05769 
   (0.07561)  (0.04971)  (0.07750)  (0.06832) 
Orissa dummy  -0.02778  0.00399  -0.01992  -0.0638 
   (0.04369)  (0.00824)  (0.04477)  (0.04484) 
Punjab dummy  -0.02447  0.00409  -0.01136  -0.05838 
   (0.04646)  (0.01150)  (0.04754)  (0.04588) 
Rajasthan dummy  -0.04078  0.00017  -0.03579  -0.08095
#
   (0.04334)  (0.01239)  (0.04472)  (0.04475) 
Tamil Nadu dummy  0.05951  0.09483**  0.06617  0.02419 
   (0.05418)  (0.02227)  (0.05608)  (0.05076) 
Uttar Pradesh dummy  -0.06353  -0.02859  -0.04766  -0.10202
#
   (0.06427)  (0.03431)  (0.06552)  (0.05907) 
West Bengal dummy  -0.031 0.00984 -0.01227  -0.0736 
   (0.05018)  (0.02029)  (0.05175)  (0.05007) 
Other dummy  0.00142  0.02677**  0.00726  -0.04066 
   (0.04019)  (0.00996)  (0.04143)  (0.04541) 
Delhi dummy  0.04054  0.08657**  0.0421  0.00324 
   (0.04818)  (0.01230)  (0.04769)  (0.05208) 
Observations 80  80  80  80 
R-squared 0.992  0.991  0.992  0.992 
Data range = 1996-2000.  Dependent variable is share of FDI.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
# Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%;  
** significant at 1%. 




Instrumental Variables Results for Labor Conflict (1996-1997) 
 
Variable (1)  (2) 
        
Instrumented state fixed  -0.02533
# -0.02183
#
effect from 1996-1997  (0.01533)  (0.01171) 
Average wage for male  0.00007  0.00007 
and female unskilled labor  (0.00009)  (0.00008) 
Gross state domestic product  0.00001*  0.00001* 
   (0.000004)  (0.000003) 
Enrolment in literacy program  0.00003*  0.00003** 
 (per thousand of population)  (0.00002)  (0.00001) 
Dummy for southern states  0.00131  0.00101 
   (0.00167)  (0.00107) 
Dummy for eastern states  0.00305  0.00298 
   (0.00274)  (0.00242) 
Loans disbursed by ICICI norm.  -0.00006  -0.00006 
by gross state domestic product  (0.00005)  (0.00004) 
Number of strikes normalized   36.02684
# 34.30241
#
by size of workforce  (20.49070)  (18.47100) 
Number of lockouts normalized   -5.70305    




   (0.00865)  (0.00808) 
Observations 16  16 
R-squared 0.388  0.44 
Dependent variable is mean man-days lost due to work-stoppage (lagged 1 year) normalized by size of workforce 
(mean of the variable taken over 1996 and 1997).  Southern states include Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and 
Karnataka.  Eastern states include Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
# Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
Tests of Instrument Validity: 
 
1.  Identifying instruments include the derived state fixed-effect from 1998-2000, the average Gini for rural and urban 
areas, normalized expenditures by the state on R&D, and the normalized number of R&D projects in the state.  An F-test 
that these identifying instruments are jointly zero is strongly rejected (F[4,11]=5.58, Probability > F = 0.0106).   
 
2.  Tests of overidentifying restrictions:  p-value for Sargan N*R-sq test = 0.8231, and p-value for Basmann test = 0.9707.  
Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which implies that our identifying instruments are valid. 
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Supplementary Appendix 
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Table 5 - Regional Dummies 
 
Dummies Regions  States 
Region 1  North  Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi 
Region 2  South  Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka 
Region 3  East  Bihar, Orissa,West Bengal 
Region 4  West  Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra 
Region 5  Other  Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikk
Himachal Pradesh, Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya 
 